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Gil Eyal is one of the most prominent sociologists studying the role of experts, intellectuals
and professionals in contemporary societies. In the last 20 years, he has written a series of
empirical studies on the role of experts in the diffusion of neoliberalism in Eastern Europe,
in the breakup of Czechoslovakia, in the formation and cultural justification of the Israeli
State and in the rise in autism diagnoses. In these carefully documented works, he has
argued in favour of the sociology of expertise as an original approach superior to the
sociology of professions. This is because it focuses not only on jurisdictional struggles (i.e.
who controls a task or problem?) but also, and crucially, on what makes it possible for a
certain form of expertise, conceived as networks of objects, actors, techniques and insti-
tutional arrangements, to be gradually assembled. The latter is now commonly known as
the ‘network’ theory of expertise and is often opposed to the ‘realist’ theory of Collins and
Evans (2007) and to the ‘institutional’ theory of Jasanoff (2004). In his last book, Eyal
takes a step back from these debates and addresses the very topical question of whether
expertise is experiencing a crisis, why this is so, and what can be done about it.
In recent years, claims that we are witnessing a crisis of expertise have circulated
across different social environments, including statements from prominent politicians,
debates in media outlets animated by pundits and journalists, and academic publications.
Among a variety of explanations, authors have attributed the crisis of expertise to the
dumbing down effect of new technologies and to the excessive democratisation and
commercialisation of education (Nichols, 2017), to a general erosion of trust in estab-
lished authorities, exacerbated by increasing inequality (Drezner, 2017), to the influence
of false relativist doctrines such as postmodernism and deconstructionism (Pinker,
2018), to widespread and long-standing magical beliefs shared by large portions of the
population of any advanced country, aggravated by increased deprivation and uncer-
tainty (Oliver & Thomas, 2018), and to the agnotological strategies deployed by pow-
erful groups to instil doubt on the public on complex issues (Oreskes & Conway, 2010).
Although most scholars who speak of a crisis of expertise see it as pernicious, some
authors have suggested that this decline of trust might in part reflect a healthy reaction
against elite encroachment and technocratic exclusion of informed and concerned lay
publics, following a script already rehearsed in many important works of what Collins
and Evans (2017) call the ‘second wave’ of science studies.
European Journal of Social Theory
2021, Vol. 24(2) 306–310





Eyal’s account is less categorical. In The Crisis of Expertise, he tries to understand
what this growing concern about expertise means in the first place. Inevitably, this leads
him to reconsider some of the most apocalyptic diagnoses advanced in recent years,
especially those that, like Nichols’ (2017), blame non-sociologically the wilful ignorance
of the public. First, what we are witnessing is not simply a crisis of expertise, but rather
what he calls a ‘two-headed pushmi-pullyu of unprecedented reliance on science and
expertise coupled with increased suspicion, scepticism, and dismissal of scientific find-
ings, expert opinion, or even of whole branches of investigation’ (p. 4). Second, the
whole concept of an ‘assault on science’ is misleading, because no single, unified,
capital-S Science exists, and because not all science is under assault, but rather what
may be called the ‘regulatory’ and ‘policy’ sciences, that is, those fields that occupy an
intermediary position between academic research and the policymaking process. Third,
and most importantly, the very concept of expertise has always presupposed a funda-
mental uncertainty about who deserves to be called an expert. Expertise, Eyal argues, is a
‘historically specific way of talking’ occasioned by a situation in which ‘the number of
contenders for expert status has increased, the bases for their claims have become more
heterogeneous and uncertain, and the struggles between them have become more
intense’ (pp. 19–20).
Since the relatively recent diffusion of the vocabulary of expertise, which dates back
to the post-war period, debates about technical matters of public concern have been
riddled with uncertainty about how to adjudicate competing claims to expertise. Exper-
tise is not the product of a ‘knowledge society’ but rather the product of a deeply
politicised, agonistic society. The ‘problem of extension’, that is, where to draw the
boundary between the experts and the laypeople, and the ‘problem of trust’, that is,
whether we should trust explicit abstract procedures or the trained judgments of experts,
have been the two main dilemmas around which academic theories of expertise as well
as real-world decision-making have been structured. Gradually, these problems have
engendered a legitimation crisis. Through an insightful reading of Jürgen Habermas and
Niklas Luhmann, Eyal argues that legitimacy cannot be conceived simply as deception
orchestrated by powerful groups, nor as the achievement of a rational consensus. Justify-
ing authority, that is making commands legitimate, takes time and involves a wide range
of rhetorical tools and a motivated group of people who will uphold and enforce public
choices.
In sum, the rhetorical repertoire of expertise was one of the most significant sources of
legitimacy employed by the liberal state to justify its policies, and it is within this
practical endeavour that something misfired. Eyal proposes a narrative in three stages.
The first stage is the ‘scientisation of politics’, coinciding with the post-war period, at a
time of massive state intervention to promote growth, increasing regulation of the econ-
omy, and massive involvement of experts at every level. Science is mobilised by the
liberal state to justify political decisions, as illustrated by the Kefauver Harris Amend-
ment, which strengthened the US Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) control over
the requirements to market new drugs. The second stage is the ‘politicisation of science’:
science becomes polluted because the prescriptions decided by unelected scientists, such
as the ‘acceptable levels of safety’ decided by an expert body, were not grounded in
objective truth and sometimes clearly benefitted certain groups over others (the FDA, for
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example, was regularly accused of having an ‘industry bias’). Lay stakeholders mobi-
lised to ‘demand transparency and a seat at the table’ (p. 102). Finally, in a third stage,
the liberal state rescues science by minimising exposure and adopting a variety of
strategies that mirror the dominant theories of expertise. This is arguably the most
interesting part of the book. These strategies are outlined by crossing two axes repre-
senting the problem of trust and extension. The first strategy is ‘exclusion’, that is,
reinforcing the boundary between experts and laypeople to ‘generate trust in technocratic
expert judgment’ (p. 105), under the assumption that introducing economic and political
interests directly into scientific deliberations is detrimental. This strategy is encapsulated
in the Daubert standard and finds a theoretical defence in Collins and Evans’ works. The
second strategy is ‘mechanical objectivity’, which shares the technocratic thrust of
the first but prioritises formal procedures over expert judgment. This is illustrated by
the widespread reliance on randomised controlled trials (RCT) by agencies like the FDA
and is also very popular in the assessment of international development aid projects. The
third strategy is ‘inclusion’, which emphasises participation of lay actors and transparent
procedures, and is epitomised by the now-common inclusion of patients’ groups in the
deliberation of medical advisory bodies. The fourth strategy, ‘outsourcing’, advocates
for the promotion of independent, self-governing organisations that are inclusive, have
limited aims (mainly establishing scientific consensus) and emphasise uncertainty and
precaution over decisions and prevention. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change illustrates this approach, while the theoretical equivalent is the idea of co-
production of science and society.
While the author’s loose preference for this latter strategy (and aversion to the exclu-
sive reliance on RCT) is clear, the normative import of the book is broader than the mere
assessment and ranking of these different approaches. Eyal argues that reacting to the
crisis of expertise by denouncing the deliberate illiteracy of the general public and
blaming the Internet and social media will backfire by widening the gap between experts
and laypeople, reinforcing mutual distrust and deepening the legitimacy crisis. Expert
organisations should instead accept to be challenged by social movements and laypeople
by making their procedures transparent and making possible for outsiders (including
maverick scientists and suspicious activists) to contribute to the scientific process.
Although some controversies might be properly speaking manufactured, Eyal believes
that events like ‘Climategate’ in the long run end up reinforcing science by removing
really existing biases and by attracting increased scrutiny and public attention. As a
telling illustration, Eyal offers the example of the Surface Stations project, a citizen
science initiative aimed at assessing the condition of US weather station promoted by
climate change deniers which ended up showing that the real temperature was higher
than reported by many stations.
Eyal concludes with a plea for embracing the ambivalence inherent in scientific
activity: the vocation of modern science requires experts to dance between confidence
that the best knowledge at our disposal should inform the decisions that shape our
society, and recognition that even our best knowledge is limited and uncertain. But truly
legitimate policy decisions based on sound expert advice will require a new institutional
configuration. Eyal tells us that which we do not want: we do not want a ‘republic of
science’, because without people keeping the experts in check fraud and violations will
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happen. We do not want an ‘agora’, because a strong backbone of professionalised
experts is necessary. And we do not want a simple ‘political debate’, characterised by
strong adversarial procedures, because this is the status quo and it is not working.
The Crisis of Expertise is an entertaining read and never fails to astound for its
richness and range. Eyal spans multiple disciplines, from the philosophy of Artificial
Intelligence to the sociology of risk, and, although he mainly tells an Anglo-American
story, he draws on a wide range of examples to develop his argument, from the 1923 Frye
ruling to the 1985 Bodmer report, and from the 1962 Kefauver Harris Amendment to the
No Child Left Behind Act of 2002. Unlike other recent books (Brown, 2009; Collins &
Evans, 2017; Moore, 2017), Eyal’s is not a political theory of the rightful place of
science in society. As noted above, it is mainly a reconstruction and interpretation of
the debate about expertise, which maps the space of possibilities rather than identifying
the appropriate route. Political theories, and not only those about scientific decision-
making, often have the unfortunate tendency to draw a stark contrast between two
equally dogmatic positions (such as ‘technocracy’ and ‘populism’), to make the case
for a balanced, sensible, intermediate position, and, in doing so, to push their opponents
into the two pitfalls. The issue with this kind of theorising is that few would accept the
way the extreme positions of the debates are depicted, and most would end up agreeing
with the intermediate position, stripped of any controversial, and therefore interesting,
traits. Collins and Evans arguably commit this sort of centrist repositioning when they
write that what their approach (which they call ‘elective modernism’) argues ‘is simply
that technological decision-making in the public domain should be approached case-by-
case and not driven by a pre-determined preference for a particular kind of outcome’
(2017, p. 124), an uncontroversial qualification if there ever was one. Eyal’s book is not
completely immune to this tendency, but, on the whole, he successfully identifies the
advantages and weaknesses of different responses to the crisis of expertise, opening up
spaces for discussion about the appropriate strategy to be taken in a given set of circum-
stances. Even when he makes explicit normative claims, such as when he suggests that as
a rule of thumb mistrustful actors and potential ‘merchants of doubt’ should be included
rather than excluded, this view is clearly formulated in contrast to plainly existing
positions in the debate about expertise, so that it retains its controversial and thought-
provoking qualities.
In sum, in a debate that is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary, international and
polarised, The Crisis of Expertise is a breath of fresh, clarifying air.
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